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ATTRITION IN CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: 
WHY LORD CHIEF JUSTICE HALE GOT IT WRONG. 
Christine Eastwood, Sally Kift and Rachel Grace  
 
Successful criminal prosecutions for sexual offences against children are more difficult to secure than 
for any other offence. Sexual assault defendants are less likely than other defendants to plead guilty, 
less likely to proceed to trial, and more likely to be acquitted. Nevertheless, four centuries after Lord 
Hale expressed the view that accusations of rape are easily made and hard to refute, the adage is still 
repeated as though it were established truth in contemporary court decisions and by 21st century 
lawyers. While there is widespread agreement in the research literature about the entrenched 
difficulties in child sexual assault cases, the underlying reasons for the low conviction rate are less well 
understood. It is argued that socio-legal, systemic and child-related factors may contribute to the high 
attrition rate in child sexual assault cases. The need for further research is discussed.     
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
…it must be remembered that it (rape) is an accusation easily to be made and 
hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, though 
never so innocent (Hale 1713)1. 
 
Lord Chief Justice Hale got it all wrong. Widely regarded as possessing a legal mind 
of the highest order,2 Hale attested to the belief that young girls and women were not 
to be trusted where accusations of sexual offences were concerned.  Though Hale’s 
other claim to legal fame has not had such a pervasive jurisprudential influence – as a 
passionate believer in witchcraft, he also presided over one of the most notorious 
witches’ trials of the 17th century3 – his articulation of this “commonsense” stereotype 
has been an enduring echo in legal pronouncements through the ages to the endemic 
detriment of sexual assault victims of all ages and profiles. Centuries after Hale, 
another eminent lawyer and legal commentator, Wigmore,4 reiterated the 
stereotypical assumption that women and children lie about sexual assault; while 
decades further on, Justice Salmon repeated the homily: 
  
[I]n cases of alleged sexual offences, it is really dangerous to convict on the 
evidence of the woman or girl alone. This is dangerous because human 
experience has shown that in these courts, girls and women do sometimes tell 
an entirely false story which is very easy to fabricate but extremely difficult to 
refute. Such stories are fabricated for all sorts of reasons, which I need not 
now enumerate and sometimes for no reason at all.5  
 
More recently, expressions of this fundamental misconception about female sexuality 
have been framed around issues of consent borne of “rougher than usual handling”, 
or whether “no” means “yes” or perhaps “maybe”, or whether particular classes of 
women or girls are more or less likely to be truthful or have suffered less 
psychological harm than their more chaste sisters (for example, females such as 
prostitutes,6 hitchhikers,7, martial or relationship rape complainants,8 children,9 and 
complainants who allege sexual assault against high profile sporting personalities10). 
                                                 
1 M Hale, Hale's Pleas of the Crown. Vol 1. (1713), Classics of British Historical Literature, 1971. 
2 J Scutt, ‘Confronting Precedent and Prejudice: Child Sexual Abuse in the Courts’ in K Oates (ed), Understanding 
and Managing Child Sexual Abuse, (1990) 312-341; Justice R Atkinson, ‘Women and Justice – Is There Justice for 
Women’ (2003) 3(1) QUT Law and Justice Journal 76. 
3 Justice Atkinson, above n 2, 5-6. 
4 See generally 3A Wigmore on Evidence (1940 edition) 744, ss 924a. 
5 R v Henry and Manning (1968) 53 Cr App R 150 at 153.  
6 D Cass, ‘R v Hakopian’ (1993) 1 Feminist Legal Studies 203. 
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It is therefore perhaps not surprising that Hale’s 17th century statement is still 
frequently quoted as ‘recognised fact’ by 21st century lawyers. Indeed, recent 
Victorian (2003) and Queensland (2000) Bar Association submissions11 repeat the 
adage as if it were established truth; while an unnerving number of quite 
contemporary court decisions infamously buttress its longevity.12 It is also true that 
Hale’s historical rendering is perpetuated by contemporary community attitudes,13 
which in turn are reflected in the gendered beliefs that continue to be evidenced by 
police, legal practitioners, the judiciary and juries. The complete factual fallacy of 
Hale’s stereotype, as proved by a significant body of knowledge and research 
gathered for over half a century, sadly has not yet reached the halls of justice. The 
empirical evidence absolutely contradicts Hale and his contemporary protégés: in 
fact, on all available evidence, allegations of sexual offences made by children are the 
most difficult to make, and some of the easiest to refute.  More than any other 
offence, successful prosecutions for sexual offences against children are difficult to 
secure in the criminal justice system.   
 
National crime statistics indicate that sexual assault is the most under-reported 
offence against the person. Exacerbating this great under-reporting, only a small 
number of alleged offenders are charged proportionate to victims’ complaints. When 
proceedings are commenced, sexual assault defendants are less likely than other 
defendants to plead guilty, less likely to proceed to trial and more likely to be 
acquitted.14 Simply put, conviction rates are low for sexual assault.  
 
Insofar as child complainants are concerned, in both Australian and overseas 
jurisdictions, only around 17% of reported sexual offences against children result in a 
conviction.15  In 2003, the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC) 
suggested that, of 6500 child sex assault offences reported to the Queensland Police 
Service (QPS) each year,  just over one half of those offences will come before the 
lower courts, about one quarter will reach the higher courts, and about one fifth (17%) 
will result in conviction of an offender.16  Given that around one in four girls and one in 
                                                                                                                                                         
7 P Easteal (ed), Balancing the Scales  – Rape, Law Reform and Australian Culture (1998) 10. 
8 H Fenwick, ‘Marital; Rights and Partial Immunity’ (1992) 142 New Law Journal 831;  S Kift, ‘That all Rape is 
Rape Even if Not by a Stranger’ (1995) 4 Griffith Law Review 60. 
9 J Scutt, above n 2; Justice Atkinson, above n 2. 
10 S Kift, ‘Sex and the Team Player: When a Team Becomes a Gang’ (2005) 30(3) Alternative Law Journal 136. 
11 See Submission by Victorian Criminal Bar Association (Submission 42 at 3) to Victorian Law Reform 
Commission (VLRC), Sexual Offences Final Report (August 2004) 89 [1.21] where it was commented that “‘the old 
adage that an allegation of rape is easy to make and hard to disprove still holds true in some cases’. Available at 
http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Sexual_Offences_Final_Report/$file/Final_Report_f
ull_version.pdf.  See also submission by Queensland Bar Association to the Inquiry into Women and the Criminal 
Code which states this myth as a ‘fact’: Office of Women’s Policy, Report of the Taskforce on Women and the 
Criminal Code, (February 2000), 213. (“Taskforce Report”). Available at http://www.women.qld.gov.au/?id=75  
12 Hale’s comments were reiterated, for example, by King CJ in R v Sherrin (No2) (1979) 21 SASR 250, 254; and 
Bollen J in R v Johns Unreported, SC of SA 26th August 1992. Note also the criticisms made by the Canadian 
Supreme Court of ill-informed and irrelevant judicial comments in R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330, [87]-[88] and 
generally the naming of rape myths and stereotypes by L’Heureux-Dube J in R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme [1991] 2 
SCR 577. 
13 P Easteal, above n 7.  
14 National Centre for Crime and Justice Statistics (NCCJS), Sexual Assault in Australia. (2004); also Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), Information Paper: Sexual Assault Information Development Framework (2003) (Cat. 
No 4518.0); see also J Stubbs, ‘Sexual Assault, Criminal Justice and Law and Order’ (2003) 14 Women Against 
Violence 14-26; VLRC, above n 11.   
15 Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC), Seeking Justice: An Inquiry into the Handling of Sexual Offences by 
the Criminal Justice System (2003) [CMC Seeking Justice Report]. Available at 
http://www.cmc.qld.gov.au/PUBS.html  
16 Ibid.  
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eight boys are sexually abused,17 the need to address the problem of case attrition 
should not be underestimated.  
 
According to a number of recent studies, there is widespread agreement about the 
entrenched difficulties and problems of attrition in child sexual assault prosecutions.18    
However, what remain less certain are the underlying reasons for the high drop out 
rate in these cases. Since the groundbreaking 1997 Australian Law Reform 
Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (ALRC and 
HREOC)19 report on children in the legal process, a myriad of reforms have followed 
in most jurisdictions, although varying in their scope, impact and effectiveness.20  
Despite best legislative efforts, reforms have not delivered the solutions that were 
both promised and so needed. Serious questions remain about the manner in which 
the criminal justice system responds to victims of child sexual abuse: every myth and 
stereotype evident in adult sexual offence cases presents in child cases, but is further 
distorted and subverts reformative attempts due to the additional layers of complexity 
resulting from the particular vulnerability of children.  Moreover, the harm to a child 
victim of sexual assault may be aggravated significantly given that children are at a 
crucial stage of their cognitive, emotional and psychological development.21 Reforms 
have not delivered to children the belief, protection or justice to which they are 
entitled; so much so that, in recent years, there has emerged in the literature a 
growing awareness and articulation that substantive legislative and procedural reform 
are not enough.22  
 
Clearly, deeper analysis of the individual, systemic and social factors that contribute 
to the problem of attrition in child sexual assault cases is required. In recognition of 
gaps in the body of knowledge, this article will provide a context for understanding 
why, despite widespread legislative and procedural reforms, a significant proportion of 
child sex assault cases are discontinued and why conviction rates are so low. 
Specifically, the problem of attrition in child sex cases will be considered from three 
interacting perspectives: the socio-legal perspective; the criminal justice system 
perspective, and the child’s perspective. Each perspective interacts to present the 
child sexual abuse complainant with entrenched and complex barriers to achieving a 
just outcome.  
 
 
II THE SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
                                                 
17 M James, ‘Child Abuse and Neglect: Part 1 – Redefining the Issues’ (2000) Australian Institute of Criminology.  
Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice Series No 146 1-6. 
18 C Humphreys, ‘Exploring New Territory: Police Organizational Responses to Child Sexual Abuse’ (1996) Child 
Abuse and Neglect, 337-344;  CMC Seeking Justice Report, above n 15; C San Lazaro, A M  Steele & L J 
Donaldson, ‘Outcome of Criminal Investigation into Allegations of Sexual Abuse’ (1996) 75(2) Archives of Disease 
in Childhood 149-52; and generally Queensland Crime Commission and Queensland Police Service (QCC & 
QPP), Project Axis: Volume 2, Child Sexual Abuse in Queensland: Responses to the Problem (2000).  
19 Australian Law Reform Commission & Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (ALRC & HREOC), 
Seen and Heard: Priority for Children in the Legal Process. ALRC No 84. (1997).  
20 See for example, Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld); Acts Amendment (Evidence of 
Children and Others) Act 1992 (WA); Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (NSW). 
21 C Eastwood, W Patton & H Stacy, ‘Child Sexual Abuse and the Criminal Justice System’ (1998) 99 Trends & 
Issues in Criminal Justice 1. See also C Eastwood  & W Patton, The Experiences of Child Complainants of Sexual 
Abuse in the Criminal Justice System, Report to the Criminological Research Council of Australia (2002); C 
Eastwood, ‘The Experiences of Child Complainants of Sexual Abuse in the Criminal Justice System ‘ (2002) 250 
Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1-6. 
22 P Easteal, Less than Equal: Women and the Australian Legal System (2001); B Esam, ‘Young Witnesses: Still 
No Justice’, in H. Westcott, G. Davies, & R. Bull (eds), Children’s Testimony: A Handbook of Psychological 
Research and Forensic Practice (2002) 309-324; L Kelly, ‘Remembering the Point: A Feminist Perspective on 
Children’s Evidence’  in H. Westcott, G. Davies, & R. Bull (eds), Children’s Testimony: A Handbook of 
Psychological Research and Forensic Practice (2002) 361-376.  
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Overwhelmingly, the empirical evidence referred to above does not support Hale’s 
contention that sexual abuse is a claim “easily made”. Nevertheless, as an Australian 
community, we do not trust children’s experience of abuse.  In a recent study 
conducted by the Australian Childhood Foundation,23 just over one in every two 
respondents did not believe, or were uncertain whether to believe or not, children’s 
stories about being abused.  Clearly, police, legal practitioners, magistrates and 
judges, as part of the community, may be likely to have similar beliefs and attitudes as 
their community peers. However, echoing the comments of White J in M v JMP and 
RP,24 the abuse of children should “rightly [be] regarded with abhorrence by the 
community”.25 It is arguable that, in this aspect of professional engagement more than 
any other, law and justice practitioners have a greater professional duty and 
responsibility to be relevantly informed, accountable and sensitive to the rights and 
needs of children in extremis than community attitudes might otherwise dictate.  
Specifically, it is unacceptable for law and justice professionals who are required to 
question and interact with vulnerable children in circumstances that are stressful and 
traumatic at numerous points of the justice, including court processes, to remain 
ignorant of the dynamics and context of child sexual abuse.   
 
The way in which sexual offences against children are dealt with in the criminal justice 
process is a particularly sensitive issue.  In this area, more than any other, 
discriminatory beliefs, cultural mythologies and ill-informed stereotypes impact on 
every stage of the investigation, prosecution and trial.26  In the last decade, sexual 
offence law reform through legislative statement has endeavoured to expose and 
neutralise the powerful and pervasive myths that surround sexual assault.27  
 
Two decades ago, when the extent of sexual abuse was re-ignited in public 
awareness, the importance of “believing” the child was established as a cornerstone 
of the child’s psychological survival.  Prominent researchers in the area28 emphasised 
the crucial importance of “acceptance and validation”29 to the child. There was also an 
implicit assumption that the truth which children were struggling to tell would be self-
evident in the legal system.30 According to Kelly, this view rapidly diminished when it 
became clear how legal practices and procedures systematically disadvantage 
children.  A frequent and powerful tactic is to undermine the child’s credibility and to 
attribute blame to the child through aggressive cross-examination, utilising the worst 
excesses of the adversarial justice system.  These aggressive practices continue 
despite the fact that some of the more well-documented extremes of the adversarial 
system in this regard would be unlikely to stand the test of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child as regards preserving children’s rights and dignity when they 
appear in court.31 If children are still being abused in the criminal justice system,32 
                                                 
23 J Tucci, C Goddard & Mitchell, Tolerating Violence against Children: Community Attitudes about Child Abuse in 
Australia (2003) 12.  
24 M v JMP and RP (1999) 108 A Crim R 129  
25 M v JMP and RP (1999) 108 A Crim R 129 at 139 
26 Eastwood &  Patton, above n 21; Scutt, above n 2; CMC Seeking Justice Report, above n 15.  
27 These legislative initiatives have been most recently captured in VLRC, above n 11; see also Canadian Justice 
L’ Hereux-Dube in R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR. 330 identifying the pervasive nature of rape myths (including that 
women fantasise about being rape victims, that women mean ‘yes’ even when they say no) repeating the 
observations she had earlier made in R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme [1991] 2 SCR 577.  
28 L Berliner & M Barbieri, ‘The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault’ (1984) 40(2) Journal of Social 
Issues 125-137; K Faller, ‘Is the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Telling the Truth? (1984) 8 Child Abuse and Neglect 
473-481; D Finkelhor, Child Sexual Abuse: New Theory and Research, (1984). 
29 R Summit ‘The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome’ (1983) 7 Child Abuse and Neglect 177-193, 
179. 
30 L Kelly, above n 22.  
31 Ibid.  
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despite decades of reform, then ultimately, the reasons why this continues must be 
addressed.  Many authors argue the fundamental problem is the ongoing history of 
denying credibility to children and the continuing influence of centuries of disbelief and 
suspicion of children who accused adults (usually men) of sexual crimes33.  A review 
of research and case law indicates that legal attitudes remain problematic.  
 
IIA Research 
 
In 1998, a study of the experiences of child complainants in Queensland indicated a 
defence culture which considered ‘if in the process of destroying the evidence, it is 
necessary to destroy the child, then so be it’.34  Further research in 2003 also 
reported the existence of problematic attitudes exhibited by some defence counsel, 
prosecutors and judicial officers including beliefs that children frequently lie about 
sexual abuse and that child complainants of 8 years of age can be cross-examined 
aggressively because they are little ‘lolitas’.  Minimisation and trivialization of sexual 
abuse were also reported; for example by referring to child sexual abuse cases as 
‘kiddy fiddling’.35  
 
The 2003 Eastwood et al study also reported that prosecutors, defence counsel and 
members of the judiciary were asked if they would want their own child in the criminal 
justice system if the child was a victim of serious sexual assault.  Only one third of 
legal participants indicated they would.  Like the children, legal participants frequently 
articulated a belief that it is not worth the trauma suffered by the child and that the 
process is “cruel and horrible”.36  
IIB Case Law 
 
Erroneous beliefs about sexual abuse are entrenched in case law.  Decisions are 
being made in Australian courts on a daily basis which most judges are not qualified 
to make. Recent legal decisions and reasoning espoused in advice such as that given 
in the recent Volkers case in Queensland further substantiate such a view.37  Lawyers 
may be experts in law – but not in sexual abuse.  Therefore it is not surprising that the 
primacy of judicial reasoning has been criticised as in fact, not reasoned, but mere 
opinion in cases involving child abuse.38  The claim that legal reasoning is objective 
and neutral and unaffected by ideology and values is false.  In reality, the beliefs and 
attitudes of lawyers do affect the decisions which are made in Australian courts on a 
daily basis.  
 
The case law on sexual assault reflects the bias and misinformation on which judicial 
decisions are often made.  Generally, key issues, which for decades have been 
widely recognized as characteristic features of sexual assault victims, are still not fully 
acknowledged or accepted by the courts.  For example, judgments on issues of fresh 
                                                                                                                                                         
32 Eastwood, Patton & Stacy, above n 21; Eastwood & Patton, above n 21. 
33 L Kelly, above n 22, 364; J Scutt, above n 2.  
34 Eastwood, Patton & Stacy, above n 21. 
35 Eastwood & Patton, above n 21. In-depth interviews were conducted with 29 legal professionals in Queensland, 
New South Wales and Western Australia.    
36 C Eastwood & W Patton, The Experiences of Child Complainants of Sexual Abuse in the Criminal Justice 
System: Final Report (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2003) 111, 
http://www.aic.gov.au/crc/reports/eastwood.pdf>. 
37 S. Kift, ‘A legal process or a justice system? Sex offences in Queensland – still seeking justice” (2003) 28(6) 
Alternative Law Journal 292-296. 
38 B Mathews, ‘Limitations Periods and Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Law, Psychology, Time and Justice’ (2003) 
11(3) Torts Law Journal 218; B Matthews, ‘Queensland Government Actions to Compensate Survivors of 
Institutional Abuse: A Critical and Comparative Evaluation’ (2004) 4(1) QUT Law and Justice Journal. 
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complaint39, sexual history40, corroboration41 have too often perpetuated myths about 
sexual assault complainants.  
 
Clearly, there is a problem.  Sexual offence proceedings have been particularly 
susceptible to sexist assumptions by the judiciary.42 As Justice L’Heureux Dubé 
commented in her dissenting judgment in Seaboyer,43 sexual offences law has been 
particularly prone to the use of stereotypes: an ‘unfortunate concomitant of a society 
which, to a large extent, holds these beliefs’.44 Indeed according to Canadian Justice 
L’Heureux-Dube,45 myths about sexual abuse and ‘stereotypes of sexuality’ pervade 
the criminal justice process.  The Victorian Rape Law Evaluation Project46 notes a 
lack of consistency and knowledge on matters of sexual assault may impact on the 
approach taken by prosecutors in taking a proactive role in protecting the complainant 
during cross examination.  The Victorian Law Reform Commission47 also argues that 
lawyers and judges are more likely to be more responsive to the needs of 
complainants and consequently more effective in their roles if they understood the 
context in which sexual offences occur.  The combination of these factors may well 
account for the continuing evidence of significant gaps between the intent of 
legislative reform and the outcomes of it in practice where sexual offences are 
                                                 
39 Fresh Complaint – The rule of fresh complaint was finally abolished in January 2004 in Qld (s 4 of the Criminal 
Law (Sexual Offences) Act as it was based on erroneous beliefs about rape and on empirical evidence that most 
victims rarely make an early complaint. Late disclosure or complaint has often been used to imply the account is a 
lie. However, an event can still be fresh in mind many years after its occurrence – particularly in relation to 
traumatic events. Section 4A reflects the view expressed by Thomas J in R v S (1998) 103 A Crim R 101 at 104 
that ‘evidence of first complaint should always be admitted as it permits a better understanding of the [victim’s] 
story, regardless of when it was made’. See also McHugh J in Suresh v R (1998) 72 ALJR 769 at 770 who stated 
‘the admissibility of recent complaint evidence is based on male assumptions”. Note also the High Court decision 
in Graham v R [1998] HCA 61 where it was held that evidence of complainant disclosure was not admissible six 
years after the event as the word ‘fresh’ is to be taken to mean ‘recent or immediate’. See also Crofts v R (1996) 
186 CLR 427 which particularly ignores that children may delay reporting for many years. Such rulings ignore 
overwhelming evidence that delayed reporting is typical in the context of child sexual abuse.  
40 Sexual History – Despite the irrelevance of sexual history to a complaint of rape, discretionary provisions can 
allow the sexual history of the complainant to be admitted into evidence with the leave of the court under s 4 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 1978 (Qld): sexual history with the accused goes to both consent and credit. 
In R v Allingham [1991] 1 Qd R 429 at 434-435 the issue was whether the prosecution could lead evidence on 
virginity. The evidence was allowed to be led, though McPherson J noted that ‘the bare fact that a woman has 
never previously had sexual intercourse is from a probative standpoint a neutral circumstance. It says nothing 
about whether on a particular occasion she did or did not give her consent.’ In R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme [1991] 2 
SCR 577 the Canadian Supreme Court stated that ‘consent [to sex] is to a person and not to a circumstance’. 
Such a view is supported by Williams J in R v Starkey [1988] 2 Qd R 294. In reality, sexual history of the 
complainant is completely irrelevant to whether a complainant was raped, whether she gave consent on the 
particular occasion in question and to her credibility. Rather, it would seem the sexual history of the accused is far 
more relevant. 
41 Corroboration – Although s 632 Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) abolished any law or rule of practice that required 
a warning to the jury that it is unsafe to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the one witness, judges 
continue to warn juries on the danger of uncorroborated evidence in sexual assault cases although clearly 
discriminatory against women and children and based on unscientific notions of the context of sexual assaults. 
See: Murray v R (1987) 39 A Crim R 315 at 322;  Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79;   R v Robinson (1999) 197 
CLR 162.  Note also comments by Wood CJ on Longman in Regina vs BWT [2002] NSWCCA 60 at 7, 13-20 who, 
commenting on the Longman direction (that by reason of delay, it would be unsafe or dangerous to convict on the 
uncorroborated evidence of the complainant alone), expressed concern that every case involving delay results in 
the warning.  
42 New South Wales Standing Committee on Law and Justice (NSWSCLJ), Report on Child Sexual Assault 
Prosecutions, Report No 22, Sydney, NSW Parliament, 2002; Z. Rathus, Rougher Than Usual Handling: Women 
and the Criminal Justice System, 2nd Edition, The Women’s Legal Service, Brisbane, 1995. 
43 R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme [1991] 2 SCR 577 
44 R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme [1991] 2 SCR 577 
45 R v Ewanchuk [1999] 1 SCR 330, 370 
46 Department of Justice, Attorney General’s Legislation and Policy Branch, The Crimes (Rape) Act 1991: An 
Evaluation Report 1997 (Rape Law Reform Evaluation Project, Report No 2) 
47 Victoria Law Reform Commission (VLRC), Sexual Offences, Melbourne: Victorian Law Reform Commission, 
2004. 
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involved.48  Decades after legislative reforms for child complainants of sexual abuse, 
the authority and influence of old legislation and case law continue to dominate the 
criminal justice system.49  So it would still seem to be the case that in child sexual 
assault cases in particular, more than any other area of law, stereotypes and 
prejudicial myths pervade the investigation, prosecution and trial50. 
 
The importance of the relationship between law reform and cultural reform has 
recently been reiterated by the Victorian Law Reform Commission. The Commission 
notes that past experience has shown procedural and evidentiary reforms are unlikely 
to make the system more responsive unless accompanied by cultural change and 
support from those who work in the system such as police, prosecutors, defence 
counsel and judiciary. 
 
 
III SYSTEMIC PERSPECTIVES 
 
In reality, the facts and figures on attrition and convictions in child sexual assault 
cases also do not support Hale’s claims that sexual assault accusations are easily 
made and hard to refute.  For example, in New South Wales in 1992 the number of 
child sexual abuse prosecutions commenced was four times the number in 1982. 
During that period the guilty plea rate dropped from 83.6% to 58%.  The conviction 
rate also fell from 92.3% to 76.5%. In other words, although more prosecutions were 
commenced, defendants were less likely to plead guilty, while the chance of obtaining 
a conviction also decreased.51 
  
In the last decade, most Australian jurisdictions have enacted significant legislative 
and procedural reforms for child complainants including widespread use of CCTV and 
pre-recording, restrictions on children being called to give evidence at committal 
proceedings, and control on aggressive cross-examination.52 However, the nature 
and extent of reforms have varied considerably between jurisdictions. For example, 
since 1992, children have not been required to appear at committals in Western 
Australia.53 More recently, the Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 
2003 (QLD) placed restrictions on the calling of children to give evidence at committal 
proceedings in Queensland.   
                                                 
48 M Heenan, ‘Just “Keeping the Peace”: A Reluctance to Respond to Male Partner Sexual Violence’ (2004) 
ACSSA Issues No.1, Australian Centre for the Study of Sexual Assault, Australian Institute of Family Studies.  Also 
available at <www.aifs.gov.au/acssa>.  See also generally for example, R Bonney, Crimes (Sexual Assault) 
Amendment Act 1981 Monitoring and Evaluation Interim Report 3: Court Procedures (NSW Bureau of Crime 
Statistics and Research, Sydney, 1987) and New South Wales, Department for Women, Heroines of Fortitude: 
The Experiences of Women in Court as Victims of Sexual Assault (Gender Bias and the Law Project, Sydney, 
1996) re working of s 409B of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). 
49 T O’Gorman, ‘Defence Strategies in Child Sexual Abuse Accusation Cases’ (1991) 18(June) Queensland Law 
Society Journal 195-207. 
50 M Barnes, S Kift and T Walsh, Submission to the Inquiry into the Handling of Sexual Offence Matters by the 
Criminal Justice System, Brisbane, 2002;  O’Gorman, above n 49. 
51 P Parkinson, S Shrimpton, H Swanston, B O'Toole and K Oates, The Process of Attrition in Child Sexual Assault 
Cases: a Case Flow Analysis of Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions (2002) 35(3) Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology 347-362; J. Cashmore, “The Prosecution of Child Sexual Assault: A Survey of 
NSW DPP Solicitors” (1995) 28 Australian and NZ Journal of Criminology 32-54.  
52 See, for example, Evidence (Protection of Children) Amendment Act 2003 (Qld); Acts Amendment (Evidence of 
Children and Others) Act 1992 (WA); Crimes Legislation Amendment Act 2003 (NSW). 
53 The Acts Amendment (Evidence of Children and Others) Act 1992 (WA) inserted subsection 69(2a). It states 
that, in a Schedule 7 preliminary hearing, the “affected child” is not to be called as a witness unless the magistrate 
is satisfied that there are special circumstances that justify the complainant being called.  However, as of 3 
January 2001, by Act 71 of 2000, a new s 69 of the Justices Act 1906 (WA) dispensed with the discretion to permit 
the affected child to be called and cross-examined if the defence could establish special circumstances.  In 2002 
the Criminal Law (Procedure) Amendment Act abolished preliminary hearings and replaced them with a regime of 
disclosure by the prosecution, and to a lesser extent, by the defence.  
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However, reforms do not appear to have resulted in substantive justice for victims nor 
in increased conviction rates.  Although concerns remain about the overall low 
disclosure rate for child sexual assault,54 across all jurisdictions there has been a 
substantial increase in prosecutions for sexual offences against children.  However, 
increased prosecutions have not resulted in increased convictions.55 Criminal court 
statistics reveal that for all offences in 2003-4, 93% of adjudicated defendants (that is, 
finalised as guilty, acquitted or guilty plea) were proven guilty in the higher courts.56  
While 84% of adjudicated defendants were finalised by pleading guilty, those 
defendants with sexual assault offences were less likely to plead guilty than any other 
offence (62% pleaded guilty). Furthermore, the offence with the highest acquittal rate 
(as a proportion of trial outcomes) was sexual assault with an acquittal rate of 61%.57  
This rate of acquittal represents a ten percent increase in rates from 51% in 2002-
2003. 
 
In a Queensland Police Service study of 28,777 sex offences from 1994-2001, about 
two thirds of reported offences progress to committal stage.  Of the two thirds to reach 
committal, 64% were committed to a higher court, and 27% were withdrawn or 
dismissed, 11% found guilty and given prison sentence or suspended sentence, while 
a further 8% were found guilty and given an intensive correction order, probation, bail 
or fine.  About 35% of the matters committed from the magistrates courts to the higher 
courts were discontinued by the prosecution (either no true bill before indictment) or 
nolle prosequi (after indictment or during trial).  Of the remaining matters in the higher 
courts, 8% were found not guilty, 9% were discharged, and 83% were found guilty (by 
trial or plea).58  
 
A recent New South Wales study on attrition in sexual assault cases 59 reported that 
criminal proceedings were commenced in only 15% of incidents involving a child 
victim. The study also found that only around 8% of recorded incidents involving 
children resulted in a sexual offence being proven in court.   
 
   
IIIA Attrition and the key drop out points 
 
Attrition can occur at a number of points in the justice process.  Legal decisions to 
discontinue a case may also occur for many reasons, and at any stage of the criminal 
justice process. Given the significant resources used in the prosecution of cases and 
the reliance placed on convictions as a child protection strategy, it is important to 
identify the proportion of cases that are discontinued, and at what stage this occurs.60  
However, data comparison is difficult due to a sheer lack of data and definitional 
variations. Conviction rates alone can be misleading as conviction rates will depend 
on a series of decisions at various stages of the prosecution process.  Given that 
around 17% of all reported child sexual offences result in a conviction, decisions 
                                                 
54 Project Axis, Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC), An Inquiry into the Handling of Sexual 
Offences by the Criminal Justice System (2003).  
55 Parkinson et al, above n 51;  J Richards ‘Protecting the Child Witness in Abuse Cases’ (2000) 34 FamLQ 393 at 
393-420; Cashmore, above n 51.   
56 According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, non-adjudicated cases are finalised by a variety of means 
including withdrawn by the prosecution, defendant unfit to plead, accused dies and statute of limitations.   
57 Acquittal rate as a proportion of trial outcomes: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Criminal Courts 2003-2004 
(2004).  It should be noted these figures do not differentiate adult and child sex offences.  
58 CMC Seeking Justice Report, above n 15. 
59 J Fitzgerald, ‘The Attrition of Sexual Offences from the New South Wales Criminal Justice System’ (2006) 92 
Crime and Justice Bulletin NSW 4. 
60  Parkinson, above n 51; CMC Seeking Justice Report, above n 15.  
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made during the criminal justice process are central to the problem of case attrition.61 
In a recent SA study, Wundersitz62 tracked cases from police incident report to 
finalisation in the courts and reported that 16.1% of reported child sex offences 
resulted in conviction. The study found that only a small proportion of child sexual 
offence cases make it through to trial completion.  Most drop-outs occur in the early 
stages of police investigation. In Queensland, Project Axis compared the progress of 
indecent dealing matters through the criminal justice system with other matters in 
order to determine if there were significant differences in the treatment of child sex 
offences in the criminal courts.  Magistrates Court data show that indecent dealing 
matters are more likely to be withdrawn than non-sexual assault matters; and 
indecent dealing matters are more likely than other offence types to be discharged 
from the Magistrates Court due to lack of evidence.  District Court data similarly show 
that a higher proportion of indecent dealing matters are discontinued than non-sexual 
assault matters63. 
 
The substantive and procedural intent of many legislative reforms has been to 
facilitate obtaining cogent and reliable evidence from children in a supportive 
environment.  However, it is important to recognise that any benefits may be 
counteracted, not only by myths and stereotypes about sexual assault victims, but 
also by decisions which reduce the numbers of cases accepted for prosecution.  For 
example, in 1998 the NSW Director of Public Prosecutions issued a memorandum to 
legal staff that he was of the view that a “significant number” of sexual assault cases 
should be discontinued. Those cases subjected to scrutiny included cases based on 
late complaint, cases where there was an arguable motive for false complaint (such 
as family dispute), and cases where different versions of events had been given.64  
Such a direction would appear to be in direct contradiction to what is known about the 
context, dynamics, and disclosure of sexual abuse.   
 
Attrition and tests 
 
Different tests are applied at different stages by police and prosecutions, and by 
magistrates at committal proceedings.  In addition, the tests and the manner in which 
they are interpreted and applied differ across jurisdictions.  Every state Director of 
Public Prosecutions has guidelines for prosecutors in making decisions about the 
                                                 
61 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), Child Abuse and Neglect in Australia, Child Welfare Series 
Number 17, Canberra, AIHW, 1995-1996; Parkinson et al, above n 55;  CMC Seeking Justice Report, above n 15; 
See also, M Hood & C Boltje, ‘The Progress of 500 Referrals from the Child Protection Response System to the 
Criminal Court’ (1998) The Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 31 which followed 500 cases of child 
sex abuse in SA from reporting through the criminal prosecution process. The study found that only 27% of cases 
substantiated by child welfare agencies resulted in prosecutions in the courts. Only 17% resulted in convictions, 
with half of these convictions a result of guilty pleas. Prosecutorial decisions about whether to proceed impacted 
significantly on the attrition rate. Also, Parkinson et al, above n 55, tracked cases in NSW and found evidence of 
45 of the 183 cases reaching trial or sentence. Of the 45 that reached trial or sentence, 32 convictions were 
recorded. This represents a 71% conviction rate for those that reached trial, and a 17% conviction rate of the 117 
cases were able to be tracked. Other studies report a 14% conviction rate: see G Goddard and P Hiller, Tracking 
Physical and Sexual Abuse Cases from a Hospital Setting into Victoria's Criminal Justice and Child Protection 
Systems: A Report for the Victorian Law Foundation (1992) 3 Department of Social Work and Department of 
Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University; see also P Gallagher, J Hickey and D Ash, Child Sexual Assault. 
An Analysis of Matters Determined in the District Court of New South Wales During 1994 (1997) Judicial 
Commission of New South Wales.  
62 J Wundersitz, ‘Child Sexual Assault: Tracking from Incident Report to Finalisation in Court’, paper presented to 
the Child Sexual Abuse: Justice Response or Alternative Resolution. Australian Institute of Criminology 
Conference, Adelaide, 1-2 May 2003. 
63 Project Axis, above n 18.  
64 Parkinson et al, above n 55.  
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conduct of cases.  There are two key considerations.65  First there must be sufficient 
evidence to justify the prosecution and provide reasonable prospects of conviction. 
This assessment considers factors such as witness competence, credibility and 
availability of witnesses, the admissibility of evidence and any other factors that could 
affect the likelihood of a conviction.  The second and overriding consideration is 
whether it is in the public interest for the matter to proceed. This is claimed to not to 
be a question of political or popular pressure, but rather an objective consideration of 
the seriousness and prevalence of the offence, factors related to victim and 
defendant, and the need to maintain public confidence in the courts.66 More research 
needs to be done on how it is that these guidelines are applied in practice in individual 
cases. The very few instances in which DPP advice becomes available for public 
scrutiny would not suggest that the process is a value-free one.67  
 
IV THE CHILD’S PERSPECTIVE 
 
One of the most powerful rebuttals of Hale’s contention comes from the children 
themselves. Child complainants can attest to the fact that to accuse an adult of sexual 
abuse is one of the most difficult and traumatic experiences in the life of a child. 
Indeed, the legal process itself causes further trauma and abuses the child.   
 
In recent research with child complainants aged 8 to 16 years across three 
jurisdictions (QLD, NSW and WA), Eastwood investigated the experiences of child 
complainants in the criminal justice system.68  When asked if they would ever report 
sexual abuse again following their experiences in the criminal justice system, only 
44% of children in Queensland, 33% in New South Wales and 64% in Western 
Australia indicated they would.  It is worth noting that the outcome of the criminal trial 
was not necessarily a predictor of response to this question, as two-thirds of children 
who experienced convictions said they would not report sexual abuse again. 
Comments from the children indicated a widespread belief that the process was not 
worth the trauma suffered. 
 
It makes me feel like it is no good going to court… It is just a waste of  
time…They don’t look after you. They couldn’t care less. . It is the hardest thing 
and it ruins your life. You never forget it (NSW Child 14yrs).  
 
We are supposed to be free after this but we are not free, we are even more 
caged up. It’s a joke – don’t put yourself through the trauma (NSW Child 16 
yrs). 
 
It’s too hard I wouldn’t want to go through it again (WA Child 16 yrs). 
 
Parents also maintained that the way children are treated in the courts leaves many 
children damaged and disillusioned.  
 
She is still very traumatized by the process and still cannot talk about it (QLD 
Parent). 
                                                 
65 R Refschauge, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion – Australia’ in G Moens & R Biffot (eds) The Convergence of Legal 
Systems in the 21st Century (Copyright Publishing, Brisbane 2002) 353-390.  
66 D Lievore, ‘Prosecutorial Decisions in Adult Sexual Assault Cases’ (2005) 291 Trends and Issues in Crime and 
Criminal Justice 1.  
67 See, eg, “NSW DPP Advice shown to Julie Gilbert” in relation to the Volkers matter, available via the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation, Four Corners website at  http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2004/s1147854.htm  
68C Eastwood, W Patton & H Stacy ‘Child Sexual Abuse and the Criminal Justice System’ (1998) 99 Trends & 
Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice.  See also comments of Pigeon J in Angus v Dillallo (1993) 11 WAR 93. 
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She just wondered why she bothered. She is quite disillusioned and quite 
angry. She said ‘they didn’t believe me’… Children aren’t stupid.  They picked 
up on how ridiculous the system was – it needs big changes (QLD Parent) 
 
The study identified a number of issues for child complainants including difficulties 
reporting the abuse, lack of child-friendly facilities in courts, giving evidence in chief, 
pre-recording evidence, judges and magistrates, verdict and sentence and problems 
with legal language.69  However, overwhelmingly the three key difficulties identified by 
the children across all jurisdictions were waiting for trial (an average of 20 months), 
seeing the accused, and the cross-examination process.   
 
The underlying reasons for the high attrition rate need to be addressed.  Both 
vulnerable child complainants and society in general need to have confidence in the 
efficacy, sensitivity and objectivity of the criminal justice processes.  Unless the 
problem is addressed, the message sent to victims may be that the stress of the court 
process is not warranted given the limited chance of getting through the process, let 
alone achieving a conviction. The problem of attrition also contributes further to 
under-reporting. The message being sent to perpetrators appears to be that the 
likelihood of being apprehended and convicted of a sexual offence is minimal and that 
they can continue to offend with impunity.  Somehow, complainants of child sexual 
abuse need to know the justice system will take their complaint seriously and will treat 
them with care and respect.70   
 
 
V      THE FUTURE 
 
The preceding discussion has provided an analysis of the socio-legal, systemic, and 
child-related perspectives on the low conviction rate in child sexual assault cases. 
However, definitive analysis is not possible without a detailed and comprehensive 
analysis of individual cases and the reasons why cases are discontinued.71   Future 
research needs to track individual cases and include qualitative data to enable a 
deeper understanding of the reasons for cases not progressing – whether systemic or 
individual.  It would also be important to understand the consequences for the 
complainant of failure to proceed, particularly in the light of concerns about 
underreporting and the trauma of the court process itself.  Research would also 
inform the investigation and prosecution of child sexual assault cases in the criminal 
justice system and inform the development of a theoretical framework crucial to 
understanding the larger problem.  
 
In summary, contrary to the claims of Hale and others, it is extremely difficult to bring 
a charge of child sexual abuse.  Based on empirical research data72 the following 
scenarios illustrate precisely how difficult.   
 
 If you are a child complainant, there is less chance of the offender being 
convicted than for any other criminal offence.  If 100 children are sexually 
abused, it is likely that only about 10 of those children will actually report the 
                                                 
69 Eastwood, above n 21. 
70 See also C San Lazaro, A Steele and L Donaldson L. ‘Outcome of Criminal Investigation into Allegations of 
Sexual Abuse’ (1996) 75(2) Archives of Disease in Childhood 149-52. 
71 Project Axis, above n 18, at 43 
72 Based on ABS Higher Court Stats 2003 -2004, above n 56 and CMC Seeking Justice Report, above n 15 citing 
QPS statistics of 28777 sex offences.  
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abuse.  Of those, only about 6 will reach committal proceedings in the lower 
courts, and only 2 or 3 will reach the higher courts.  Of those, only about 1 or 2 
cases will result in a conviction.  
 
On the other hand, if you are accused of sexual abusing a child, you have an 
excellent chance of being acquitted.  For a perpetrator, there is less than a 1 in 
10 chance that the child will even report that s/he has been sexually assaulted. 
Even if the child does report the abuse, a perpetrator has a 1 in 3 chance it will 
not even make it to a preliminary hearing.  If the matter gets through committal 
proceedings there is a 1 in 3 chance the case will not proceed to trial 
(discontinued by no true bill or nolle prosequi).  If the case proceeds to trial, the 
accused will have a 61% chance of being acquitted – a better chance of being 
acquitted than for any other criminal offence.  
 
Hale didn’t have a clue.  With the knowledge and evidence available today, today’s 
lawyers have no such excuse in cases of child sexual abuse. 
